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I. INTRODUCTION
“Sometimes when I’m alone with my baby, I think about killing
him. He reminds me of the man who raped me.”1
1. Kevin Sieff, Members of a U.N. Peacekeeping Force in the Central African
Republic Allegedly Turned to Sexual Predation, Betraying Their Duty to Protect,
WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/
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A Burundian soldier dragged this 14-year old girl into his barracks
and raped her in Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR), leaving
her pregnant with the baby boy of whom she speaks.2 The Burundian
solder will likely never be prosecuted for his crime. This girl’s story
is shocking on its own, but, unfortunately, her situation is not
unique.3 Since the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in
CAR began in 2014, its employees have been formally accused of
sexually abusing or exploiting forty-two local civilians, the majority
being underage girls.4
Furthermore, the controversy over inappropriate sexual exploits by
UN peacekeepers is not limited to the CAR.5 A United Nationsappointed external panel reported, “In the absence of concrete action
to address wrongdoing by the very persons sent to protect vulnerable
populations, the credibility of the UN and peacekeeping operations
are in jeopardy.”6 The international community should demand that
peacekeepers be included under the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to correct the deficiency in criminal
prosecutions of UN peacekeepers.
The current system to punish UN peacekeeper misconduct relies
on the national governments of troop-contributing countries to
domestically prosecute the troops they contributed.7 Although the
2016/02/27/peacekeepers/?utm_term=.79788f4a011e.
2. Id.
3. E.g., Human Rights Watch, Central African Republic: Ugandan Troops
Harm Women, Girls, (May 15, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/15/
central-african-republic-ugandan-troops-harm-women-girls; United Nations News
Centre, Central African Republic: UN Completes Investigations into Allegations of
Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers, (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewsID=55722#.WVTxd4WcGU.
4. Sieff, supra note 1.
5. See United Nations Office of International Oversight Services, Evaluation
of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation and
Abuse by the United Nations and Related Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations,
4, U.N. Doc. IED-15-001 (May 5, 2015) https://oios.un.org/page?slug=evaluationreport (noting similar instances of abuses by U.N. missions in Haiti, South Sudan,
and Liberia).
6. See Kambiz Foroohar, Bloomberg: The UN Peacekeepers Raple Scandal
Gets Worse, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, June 17, 2017),
https://whistleblower.org/multimedia/bloomberg-un-peacekeepers-rape-scandalgets-worse.
7. United Nations Office of International Oversight Services, supra note 5;
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United Nations can repatriate UN peacekeepers and ban them from
participating in future UN missions, member states currently retain
exclusive jurisdiction over peacekeepers for civil and criminal
liability.8 Thus, member states retain discretion as to whether or not
they prosecute their peacekeepers for violating the law of armed
conflict and international humanitarian law.9
Very few countries actually prosecute their peacekeepers, but
countries that pursue prosecution generally utilize domestic military
tribunals.10 Incorporating UN peacekeepers into the jurisdiction of
the ICC would establish one, constant body with jurisdiction over
peacekeeper crimes. This solution would allow national governments
to retain primary jurisdiction over the prosecution of peacekeepers,
while also creating a backup mechanism to prosecute UN
peacekeepers when their countries of origin fail to do so.
First, this article will discuss the development of the United
Nations and its peacekeeping function, as well as the various
problems that have arisen from this increasingly vital branch of the
United Nations. Second, this article will examine how the United
Nations handles peacekeeper misconduct and compare that with the
treatment of peacekeeper misconduct by individual countries and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Third, this article will
argue that the international community should incorporate UN
peacekeepers into the jurisdiction of the ICC as the best solution to
overcome the failure to hold UN peacekeepers criminally liable for
Róisín Burke, Central African Republic Peacekeeper Sexual Crimes, Institutional
Failings: Addressing the Accountability Gap, 14 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 97, 111
(2016).
8. United Nations, Disciplinary Processes, (last visited July 10, 2017),
https://conduct.unmissions.org/enforcement-disciplinary.
9. Id.
10. See CARLA FERSTMAN, CRIMINALIZING SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE
BY PEACEKEEPERS
9-10 (United States Institute of Peace 2013),
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR335Criminalizing%20Sexual%20Exploitation%20and%20Abuse%20by%20Peacekee
pers.pdf (highlighting how domestic courts often try peacekeepers for established
crimes that do not match the actual crimes that occurred); United Nations,
Criminal Accountability of United Nations Officials, Experts on Mission Critical to
Organization’s Credibility, Legal Committee Stresses in Debate,
U.N. Doc. GA/L/3485 (Oct. 22, 2014) [hereinafter UN Criminal Accountability],
https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gal3485.doc.htm.
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their misconduct.

II. WITH GREAT POWER COMES GREAT
RESPONSIBILITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND UN PEACEKEEPING
The United Nations was created as an international body to
maintain international peace and security.11 As the role of the United
Nations has evolved, so has its role in international peacekeeping.
Although peacekeeping is not explicitly provided for in the UN
Charter, it has become one of the main tools used by the UN Security
Council.12 UN peacekeeping has become such an important tool that
the United Nations has even established the UN Department of
Peacekeeping to operate and manage peacekeeping missions.13
The constantly changing nature of conflict intensifies the
complexities of peacekeeping.14 Moreover, the United Nations has
been heavily criticized for its failure to act against peacekeeper
misconduct.15 Initially, the concerns over peacekeeper misconduct
stemmed from the excessive use of force,16 particularly on civilian
populations during UN missions.17 More recently, the controversy
11. William K. Lietzau & Joseph A. Reptilian Jr., History and Development of
the International Law of Military Operations, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 14, 19 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter
Fleck eds., 2d ed. 2015). https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gal3485.doc.htm.
12. UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: PRINCIPALS AND GUIDELINES 13 (2008),
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf.
13. Michael Bothe, Peacekeeping, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
A COMMENTARY, 1181, 1183-84 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); United
Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/about/dpko (last visited July 11, 2017) [hereinafter United Nations
Peacekeeping].
14. Lietzau & Rutigaliano, supra note 11, at 19.
15. See Thomas W. Jacobson, U.N. Peacekeeping: Few Successes, Many
Failures, Inherent Flaws, INT’L DIPL. & PUB. POL’Y, LLC 3-5 (2012),
http://www.idppcenter.com/UN_Peacekeeping_Failures.pdf (“No failure did more
to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the
1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.”).
16. See Siobhán Wills, Continuing Impunity of Peacekeepers: The Need for
Convention, 4 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 47, 49-50 (2013).
17. U.N. Secretary-General, Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the
Secretary-General on the UN Inquiry on the Violent Demonstration of 27 January
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surrounding UN peacekeepers has shifted to acts of sexual
misconduct by UN peacekeepers.18
The role of peacekeepers is often ambiguous, and determining
who has jurisdiction to prosecute their illegal actions can be a
challenge. However, troop-sending countries have jurisdiction to
prosecute the troops they contribute to UN missions. Moreover, the
nature of the crimes committed by UN peacekeepers indicates that
the peacekeepers are also subject to the law of armed conflict.19

A. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
The term “United Nations” first appeared on January 1, 1942
when representatives from the twenty six nations at war with the
Axis powers in World War II met in Washington D.C. to sign the
Declaration of the United Nations endorsing the Atlanta Charter.20
This agreement established a pledge by those nations to use their full
resources against the Axis powers and to not make a separate
peace.21 At the Quebec Conference in August 1943, the American
and British secretaries of state agreed to draft a declaration proposing
the creation of an international organization.22
In August to September 1944, U.S., British, Soviet, and Chinese
representatives met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington D.C. to draft
the charter for this international organization based on the principle

2015 in Gao, Mali, (Apr. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Secretary-General Statement on
Gao],
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2015-04-02/statementattributable-spokesman-secretary-general-un-inquiry (discussing the unauthorized
and excessive force utilized against civilian protestors during the UN Mission in
Mali).
18. Amnesty International, Mandated to Protect, Equipped to Succeed?
Strengthening Peacekeeping in Central African Republic, 10 (2016)
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr19/3263/2016/en/(listing
multiple
reports of UN peacekeepers’ part of the mission in the Central African Republic).
19. Tristan Ferraro, The Applicability and Application of International
Humanitarian Law to Multinational Forces, 95 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 561,
606-607 (2014).
20. Office of the Historian, The Formation of the United Nations, 1945, DEP’T
OF STATE (last visited July 11, 2017), https://history.state.gov/milestones/19371945/un.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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of collective security.23 The details were finalized at the Yalta
Conference in 1945.24 In April to June 1945, representatives from
fifty nations met in San Francisco and completed the Charter of the
United Nations.25
The ultimate goal of the UN Charter is to maintain international
peace and security.26 The UN Charter forbids the use of force
between nations and requires member states to “settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”27
The UN Charter also protects the sovereignty of all member states.28
For example, the Charter declares, “All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”29
The United Nations consists of a General Assembly of all member
states and a Security Council with five permanent members and six
non-permanent members.30 To act on all matters other than
procedural matters, the UN Charter requires the affirmative vote of
nine members of the Security Council, including the concurring
votes of the permanent members.31

B. THE RISE OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING FUNCTION
The idea of international peacekeeping began under the League of
Nations, the predecessor of the United Nations.32 Specifically,
peacekeeping authority stemmed from Article 16 of the Covenant of
the League of Nations, which provided for military enforcement
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Lietzau & Rutigaliano, supra note 11, at 19.
27. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 3; Lietzau & Rutigaliano, supra note 11, at 19.
28. See Lietzau & Rutigaliano, supra note 11, at 19.
29. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
30. Office of the Historian, supra note 20.
31. Lietzau & Rutigaliano, supra note 11, at 21. Permanent Members of the
Security Council, referred to as the P-5, include: China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
32. See Bothe, supra note 13, at 1176.

ss

ridan Pre

The She

154

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:1

measures.33 Even from the early days of the United Nations,
“military elements were used as tools to maintain or restore peace.”34
UN peacekeeping efforts are described as “international uses of the
military instrument, but with a mission and authority that is limited
in nature.”35
Typically, UN peacekeeping engages the “use of military
observers and lightly armed monitors who are responsible to
monitor, report, and provide a confidence-building presence in
support of ceasefires and limited peace agreements.”36 However,
there is still quite a bit of variety in peacekeeping missions and the
legal authority to use force within those missions.37
Peacekeeping is not explicitly provided for in the UN Charter but
has nonetheless become one of the main tools of the United Nations,
particularly the Security Council.38 Although peacekeeping
operations have traditionally been associated with Chapter VI of the
UN Charter, the legal basis for peacekeeping is derived from
Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter.39
Chapter VI allows the Security Council to call upon parties to
settle any dispute that is likely to endanger international peace and
security.40 Chapter VII gives the Security Council the authority to
decide what measures should be taken “to maintain or restore
international peace and security when it is threatened.”41 Under
Chapter VIII, the Security Council can utilize regional arrangements

33. Id. (noting that only three operations involving military components were
planned or executed under the League of Nations, and none of them constituted
enforcement action within the meaning of that provision).
34. See id.
35. Lietzau & Rutigaliano, supra note 11, at 21.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. United Nations Dep’t of Peacekeeping Operations, supra note 12, at 13.
39. Id. The Security Council does not need to refer to a specific chapter of the
Charter when passing a resolution authorizing the deployment of UN peacekeeping
operations. Id. The Security Council has never invoked Chapter VI but has adopted
the practice of invoking Chapter VII when authorizing the deployment of UN
peacekeepers into volatile situations. Id.
40. U.N. Charter art. 33-38.
41. U.N. Charter art. 39-51.
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or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.42
In order to establish UN peacekeeping operations, there must be a
“complex legal transaction.”43 The basis for a UN peacekeeping
operation is found in a decision, known as a resolution, by the
Security Council.44 A Security Council resolution can be preceded, or
followed, by action of the General Assembly, specifically an
agreement between and/or with the parties to a conflict.45 The
Security Council has the authority to impose a peacekeeping
operation in any country by a binding resolution, but the agreement
of parties involved is sought because peacekeeping is supposed to be
a consent-based instrument.46
In 1992, the United Nations officially established the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).47 However, the
DPKO traces its roots back to 1948 with the creation of the first UN
peacekeeping operations – UN Truce Supervision Organization
(UNTSO) and UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
(UNMOGIP).48 Peacekeeping operations were managed through the
UN Office of Special Political Affairs until the late 1980s.49 The
DPKO was formally created when Boutros Boutros-Ghali took office
as Secretary-General of the United Nations.50

42. U.N. Charter art. 52-54.
43. Bothe, supra note 13, at 1183.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See United Nations Peacekeeping, supra note 13 (providing political and
executive direction to UN Peacekeeping operations around the world and
integrating the efforts of UN governmental and non-governmental entities in the
context of peacekeeping operations).
48. See United Nations Peacekeeping, supra note 13; see also United Nations
Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, UNMOGIP Background,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/background.shtml
(last
visited July 26, 2017) (explaining that the UNMOGIP was established in 1948 to
investigate and mediate the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir);
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, UNTSO Background,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/background.shtml (last visited
July 26, 2017) (explaining that the UNTSO was established in 1948 to act as a
group of military observers in the Middle East in response to the conflicts there).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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The job of the DPKO is to handle the overall operation and
management of peacekeeping.51 The DPKO “provides political and
executive direction to UN Peacekeeping operations around the world
and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial
contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of
Security Council mandates.”52 After the Cold War, the DPKO
expanded its operations from a strictly military model to a
multifaceted approach that allows for a more comprehensive focus
on sustainable peace.53
A peacekeeping operation is formed in the following steps: (1)
appointment of the command structure and the members of the
civilian component by the Secretary-General; (2) an agreement
between the UN and a state contributing troops by which national
military units are transferred and placed under UN authority.54 There
have been seventy-one peacekeeping missions since 1948, and
sixteen of those operations are currently active.55
The cost of peacekeeping is often criticized as being too high; the
UN peacekeeping budget is around $8 billion each year.56 This
51. Bothe, supra note 13, at 1183-84.
52. United Nations Peacekeeping, supra note 13.
53. See Lietzau & Rutigaliano, supra note 11, at 21 (noting the DPKO shifted
its approach from a strictly military model to an approach that focused on other
peacekeeping functions such as building table institutions of governance, human
rights monitoring, and demobilization and reintegration of former combatants
among other functions).
54. Bothe, supra note 13, at 1184.
55. United Nations, Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, (last updated May 31, 2017)
[hereinafter Peacekeeping Fact Sheet], http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml (conducting currently active operations
MINURSO in Western Sahara since April 1991; MINUSCA in Central African
Republic since April 2014; MINUSMA in Mali since April 2013; MINUSTAH in
Haiti since June 2004; MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since
July 2010; UNAMID in Darfur since July 2007; UNDOF in Syria since June 1974;
UNIFICYP in Cyprus since March 1964; UNIFIL in Lebanon since March 1978;
UNISFA in Abyei, Sudan since June 2011; UNMISS in South Sudan Since July
2011; UNOCI in Cote d’Ivoire since April 2004; UNMIK in Kosovo since 1999;
UNMIL in Liberia since September 2003; UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan since
January1949; UNTSO in the Middle East since May 1949).
56. Better
World
Campaign,
UN
Peacekeeping
101,
https://betterworldcampaign.org/un-peacekeeping/un-peacekeeping-101/
(last
visited July 16, 2017); United Nations, Financing Peacekeeping,
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budget finances fourteen of the sixteen UN peacekeeping operations
and supports logistics for the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM).57 The budget also funds support, technology, and
logistics for all peace operations through global service centers.58
The United States is by far the biggest contributor to the UN
peacekeeping budget contributing about twenty-nine percent of the
budget in 2016.59 The next highest contributor, China, only gave
funding for about ten percent of the UN peacekeeping budget.60

C. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING UN PEACEKEEPING
Peacekeeping has always been complex, and the changing nature
of conflict has only made peacekeeping more difficult.61 The United
Nations has been repeatedly criticized over the years for its failure to
act against peacekeeper misconduct.62 An external panel appointed
by the Secretary-General has even referred to the UN’s handling of
allegations of peacekeeper misconduct as “a gross institutional
failure.”63
Controversy surrounding UN peacekeeping began with major
concerns over the use of force by UN peacekeepers in conflict
situations,64 or in some cases the failure to use force when it arguably
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml (last visited July
10, 2017) [hereinafter Financing Peacekeeping]. For comparison, the UN
peacekeeping budget is less than one half percent of world military expenditures,
which was estimated at about $1,747 billion in 2013. Id.
57. Financing Peacekeeping, supra note 56.
58. Id.
59. Id. (displaying country contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget for
2016: (1) United States 28.57%, (2) China 10.29%, (3) Japan 9.68%, (4) Germany
6.39%, (5) France 6.31%, (6) United Kingdom 5.80%, (7) Russian Federation
4.01%, (8) Italy 3.75%, (9) Canada 2.92%, and (10) Spain 2.44%).
60. Financing Peacekeeping, supra note 56.
61. Lietzau & Rutigaliano, supra note 11, at 22.
62. Foroohar, supra note 6.
63. Id. For example, the United Nations has recently been under fire for
ignoring rape scandals in the Central African Republic. Id.
64. See Somini Sengupta, Inquiry Finds ‘Excessive Force’ by U.N. Officers in
Mali Killings, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/
world/africa/inquiry-finds-excessive-force-by-un-officers-in-mali-killings.html
(discussing a United Nations inquiry into UN officers after peacekeepers in Mali
killed three civilians and wounded four others and inappropriate excessive force
was found).
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would have been appropriate.65 However, more recently, the use of
force dilemma has been overshadowed by the increase in sexual
misconduct by peacekeepers.66 Nonetheless, these issues go hand-inhand because both use of force and sexual misconduct create a
question regarding whether peacekeepers cause more harm than
good.67
1. Use of Force
The Security Council authorizes the use of force by member
states.68 But in the post-Cold War era, the use of force with or
without Security Council authorization became more prevalent.69
Some UN member states do not support the use of any force by
peacekeepers, some think that peacekeepers should use most types of
force, and others fall somewhere in the middle.70
The overuse of force by UN peacekeepers on certain missions
caused a lot of backlash.71 For instance, in Somalia, a US-led UN
humanitarian operation developed into a gory battle against a
powerful warlord.72 Moreover, during the peacekeeping mission in
65. E.g., Human Rights Watch, DR Congo: Army, UN Failed to Stop
Massacre, (July 2, 2014, 8:01 PM) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch DR Congo],
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/02/dr-congo-army-un-failed-stop-massacre
(highlighting the failure of the United Nations, DRC military, and MONUSCO in
responding to a massacre in the DRC when peacekeepers were aware of the
massacre, had the resources to provide support to civilians, and did not respond).
66. E.g., Joshua Berlinger, Holly Yan, & Richard Roth, U.N. Peacekeepers
Accused of Raping Civilians, CNN (Apr. 6, 2016, 4:42 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/06/africa/united-nations-peacekeepers-sexualabuse/index.html (reporting that United Nations Peacekeepers in the Central
African Republic have plagued the country by sexually abusing civilians and
noting that more than 100 allegations of sexual abuse had been made).
67. See A.B. Fetherston, UN Peacekeepers and Cultures of Violence,
CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. MAG., March 1995, https://www.culturalsurvival.org/
publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/un-peacekeepers-and-cultures-violence.
68. RALPH ZACKLIN, THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT AND THE USE OF
FORCE IN A UNIPOLAR WORLD 2 (2010).
69. Id.
70. See Chris McGreal, What’s the Point of Peacekeepers When They Don’t
Keep the Peace?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/sep/17/un-united-nations-peacekeepers-rwanda-bosnia.
71. See id.
72. See id.
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Sierra Leone, Nigerian forces allegedly committed a variety of
international crimes for which they have never been tried.73 After
these missions, the United Nations was overly cautious in allowing
its peacekeepers to use any type of force, creating even more
controversy surrounding peacekeepers.74
In the 1990s particularly, the UN’s failure to use force caused
serious criticism for lack of action.75 For example, on the first day of
the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, hundreds of Tutsis sought refuge in
a school guarded by ninety UN peacekeepers from Belgium armed
with a machine gun at the entrance and with a UN flag flying over
the school.76 Some days later, despite warnings of the imminent
genocide, peacekeepers were ordered to abandon the school to escort
foreigners to the airport and out of Rwanda.77 Within hours, the two
thousand people who sought refuge at the school were murdered.78
Similarly, in Bosnia, the initial deployment of the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) included no military units; it was
composed entirely of military observers.79 Subsequently, merely one
year after the tragedy in Rwanda, Dutch peacekeepers failed to stop
the massacres of eight thousand Muslim men in Srebrenica, which
was supposed to be a UN safe area.80 The incident in Srebrenica was
later labeled as the most infamous mass murder by the Serbs in
Bosnia.81
2. Sexual Misconduct
The use of force issue within UN peacekeeping forces has evolved
73. GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF
PEACEKEEPERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 11 (2004).
74. See Barney Henderson, What Have Been the Successes and Failures of UN
Peacekeeping Missions?, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 28, 2015, 8:00 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/bosnia/11729436/Srebrenica20-years-on-What-have-been-the-successes-and-failures-of-UN-peacekeepingmissions.html.
75. See id.
76. McGreal, supra note 70.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Zacklin, supra note 68, at 46.
80. McGreal, supra note 70.
81. Id.
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into a much bigger issue of sexual assault as allegations of sexual
assault have become more common than claims of unjustified
force.82 The persistent accusations of rape and sexual exploitations
by peacekeepers are becoming more frequent in an overwhelming
number of UN operations.83 The United Nations has even developed
a name for the accidental children of UN troops; they call them
“peacekeeper babies.”84
Since the 1990s, sexual exploitation and abuse by UN
peacekeepers and personnel has been reported from peacekeeping
missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
South Sudan, although this list is not exclusive.85 Troops implicated
in the abuse have been from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,
Uganda, Burundi, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, and more.86
In 2016, 103 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse were
reported in UN field missions.87 Less than fifty percent of those
allegations stemmed from incidents occurring before 2016.88 This
number of allegations is notably higher than the previous six years of
recorded allegations.89 Moreover, the number of military
82. See Azad Essa, UN Peacekeepers Hit by New Allegations of Sex Abuse, AL
JAZEERA (July 10, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/peacekeepershit-allegations-sex-abuse-170701133655238.html (reporting on 55 new allegations
of sexual abuse by UN Peacekeepers around the world from January to July of
2017).
83. See Panel to Review UN Response to Alleged Central African Republic Sex
Abuse, GUARDIAN (June 22, 2015) [hereinafter Guardian UN Response],
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/22/panel-to-review-un-response-toalleged-central-african-republic-sex-abuse.
84. Sieff, supra note 1.
85. Human Rights Watch, UN: Stop Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers, (Mar. 4,
2016, 12:02 PM) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch Stop Sexual Abuse],
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/04/un-stop-sexual-abuse-peacekeepers.
86. Id.
87. United Nations, Peacekeeping Initiatives in Action Addressing Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse (March 2017) [hereinafter UN Initiatives in Action],
https://conduct.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/factsheet_v._8_march_2017.pdf.
88. Id.
89. See
Chart
of
UN
Sexual
Exploitation
and
Abuse,
https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-overview (last visited Apr. 30, 2017)
[hereinafter UN Sexual Abuse Chart].
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perpetrators, as opposed to civilian, police, or unknown perpetrators,
was higher in 2016 than it has been in the past decade.90
Interestingly, as the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and
abuse has increased, the number of allegations of other misconduct
has decreased.91

D. JURISDICTION OVER UN PEACEKEEPERS
International jurisdiction over UN peacekeepers is currently
somewhat ambiguous. On August 6, 1994, the Secretary-General
released a bulletin that stated, “In case of violations of international
humanitarian law, members of the military personnel of a United
Nations force are subject to prosecution in their national courts.”92
However, the bulletin does not affect the protected status of members
of peacekeeping operations under the 1994 Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel or the members’ status
as non-combatants, as long as they are entitled to the protection
given to civilians under the international law of armed conflict.93
The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel does not technically apply to a UN operation “authorized
by the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel
are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to
which the law of international armed conflict applies.”94 Nonetheless,
most, if not all, UN operations are classified as peacekeeping
operations, not peace enforcement operations, though the line
between the two is often extremely blurred.95
90. See id. (noting that, of the 103 allegations in 2016, seventy-three were
committed by military perpetrators, twenty-three by civilians, and seven by local
police).
91. See id.
92. U.N. Secretariat, Secretary-General’s Bulletin - Observance by United
Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, § 4, U.N. Doc.
ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999) [hereinafter Secretary-General’s Bulletin 1999].
93. Id. § 1.2.
94. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel art.
2, ¶ 2, Dec. 9, 1994, 2051 U.N.T.S. 363 [hereinafter Convention on UN Personnel
Safety].
95. See United Nations, Peace and Security, http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml (last visited July 8, 2017) [hereinafter United
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Peace enforcement involves the use of “a range of coercive
measures, including the use of military force.”96 Peace enforcement
requires explicit authorization from the Security Council.97
Meanwhile, in principle, peacekeeping operations are “deployed to
support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement.”98 But
peacekeeping operations often play an active role in peacemaking
efforts and early peacebuilding activities.99
Peacekeeping operations today are multidimensional to “facilitate
the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the
organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and
assist in restoring the rule of law.”100 UN peacekeepers “may use
force to defend themselves, their mandate, and civilians, particularly
in situations where the State is unable to provide security and
maintain public order.”101
Despite its attempt to distinguish between the various roles in
peace missions, the United Nations admits that “the boundaries
between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping,
peacebuilding, and peace enforcement have become increasingly
blurred.”102 Moreover, views on the use of force have evolved
significantly since the 1990s when this somewhat arbitrary
distinction between peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations
was created. 103 Nowadays, allowing the use of force in peacekeeping
operations is more of a norm,104 and, in effect, most peacekeeping
Nations Peace and Security] (clarifying that most peace operations are not limited
to one type of activity causing the boundaries between conflict prevention,
peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement to be blurred).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. (discussing how, often times, peacekeeping requires a more active
role beyond maintaining a ceasefire because of the tense political climate or the
need to protect civilians while moving for disarmament).
100. United Nations Peace and Security, supra note 95.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Alex Whiting, Peacekeeping: A Brief Guide, THOMSON REUTERS
FOUND. (Sept. 21, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://news.trust.org/item/20130919155317qsnfr/.
104. See James Sloan, The Use of Offensive Force in U.N. Peacekeeping: A
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operations contain elements of peace enforcement operations, even if
they continue to be called peacekeeping operations.105
Furthermore, in 2008, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
encouraging criminal accountability of United Nations officials and
experts on missions.106 The resolution emphasizes “the need to
enhance international cooperation to ensure the criminal
accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission”
and further highlights “the need for the United Nations and its
Member States to urgently take strong and effective steps to ensure
criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on
mission in the interest of justice.”107
Although the 2008 resolution focuses primarily on encouraging
states to hold UN peacekeepers criminally liable instead of calling
for an international solution, this resolution indicates that, despite
earlier statements by UN bodies regarding peacekeeper immunity,
the United Nations recognizes the importance of holding
peacekeepers criminally liable for their misconduct while
participating in UN peacekeeping missions.108
Under appropriate circumstances, UN peacekeepers can be subject
to the law of armed conflict.109 Nonetheless, distinguishing between
peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations is nearly impossible.
Accordingly, an argument against criminal liability for peacekeepers
based on the nature of the relevant operation will likely crumble
under international scrutiny. Thus, a peacekeeper’s actions do fall
Cycle of Boom and Bust?, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 385, 391-93
(2007).
105. See id. (discussing elements peacekeeping operations and peace
enforcement operations share such as the requirement to sometimes use force to
maintain or achieve peace).
106. G.A. Res. 63/119 ¶ 2 (2009).
107. Id.
108. U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to the Security Council addressing the
situation in the Central African Republic (Aug. 13, 2015) [hereinafter SecretaryGeneral
Remarks],
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2015-0813/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-consultations-situation.
109. See Knoops, supra note 73, at 11 (demonstrating that past controversies
around the actions of peacekeeping forces, like ECOMOG peacekeepers in Sierra
Leone, illustrate the necessity of prosecuting international peacekeepers for
international crimes).
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under the law of armed conflict if there is an ongoing conflict.

III. UN PEACEKEEPER MISCONDUCT: A
COMPARISON OF PROSECUTION MECHANISMS
FOR PEACEKEEPERS WITHIN THE UNITED
NATIONS, INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, AND NATO
Currently, the United Nations can only punish peacekeeper
misconduct through an internal disciplinary system.110 This system
allows for the individual to be repatriated and banned from future
participation in peacekeeping operations.111 However, the troops
contributed by member states remain under the exclusive jurisdiction
of their national government.112 Thus, any criminal or civil
accountability for peacekeeper misconduct must occur at the
domestic level.113
If a country prosecutes its troops for misconduct while serving as a
UN peacekeeper, the prosecution typically occurs in a military
tribunal.114 However, because of the nature of these domestic military
tribunals, each country deals with the misconduct differently, and
often the treatment of these cases is inconsistent from case to case.115
110. United Nations, Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
https://conduct.unmissions.org/enforcement-disciplinary (last visited July 10,
2017) [hereinafter UN Addressing Sexual Exploitation] (stating that when
allegations of misconducted have been investigated and substantiated an internal
department, the Office of Human Resources Management, takes over decisions
concerning disciplinary measures).
111. United Nations, supra note 8.
112. United
Nations,
Investigations,
https://conduct.unmissions.org/
enforcement-investigations (last visited July 8, 2017) [hereinafter UN
Investigations].
113. United Nations, supra note 8.
114. Ferstman, supra note 10.
115. Compare Edward Wong, Sergeant Is Sentenced to 8 Years in Abuse Case,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
22,
2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/22/
world/middleeast/sergeant-is-sentenced-to-8-years-in-abuse-case.html?mcubz=1;
with Center for Economic and Policy Research, Reduced Charges Against
Uruguayan Minustah Troops Latest Example of Lack of U.N. Accountability,
(Sept. 4, 2012), http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/reducedcharges-against-uruguayan-minustah-troops-latest-example-of-lack-of-unaccountability (illustrating how the United States sentenced Staff Sgt. Ivan L.
Frederick II to eight years in prison for the abuses he enacted at the Abu Graib
prison but a court in Haiti gave a lesser sentence for four Uruguayan peacekeepers
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Interestingly, NATO has taken a proactive stance on troop problems,
and as of 2015, there were no known allegations of sexual
misconduct against NATO peacekeepers.116

A. THE CURRENT UN SYSTEM DISCIPLINES UN PEACEKEEPERS
BUT RELIES ON TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES TO PROSECUTE
DOMESTICALLY FOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The United Nations has a system in place to pursue reports of
peacekeeper misconduct. In fact, the United Nations dedicates an
entire portion of its website to conduct in UN field missions.117 But
the current system relies on the participation of the troopcontributing country; diminishing the likelihood of holding UN
peacekeepers accountable for their misconduct. The United Nations
separates the different parts of the process into four pieces: (1)
complaint, (2) investigation, (3) disciplinary processes, and (4)
accountability.118
People can file complaints to bring possible misconduct to the
attention of the United Nations119 Once the United Nations receives
information about possible misconduct it begins an investigation.120
However, members of military contingents utilized in UN operations,
such as the troops contributed by member states, stay under the
exclusive jurisdiction of their national government.121 As a result, the
responsibility of investigating an allegation of misconduct and
proceeding with subsequent disciplinary action remains with the

who committed a similar act of violence).
116. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS, STOPPING HUMAN TRAFFICKING, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, AND ABUSE BY
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPERS (June 2007), https://2009-2017.state.gov/
j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/86207.html.
117. United
Nations,
Conduct
in
U.N.
Field
Missions,
https://conduct.unmissions.org/ (last visited July 8, 2017).
118. United Nations, Enforcement, https://conduct.unmissions.org/enforcement
(last visited July 8, 2017).
119. United Nations, Complaints, https://conduct.unmissions.org/enforcementcomplaints (last visited July 8, 2017) [hereinafter UN Complaints] (explaining that
anyone can report the misconduct of UN personnel to the UN Office for Internal
Oversight Services).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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troop-contributing country.122
Some troop-contributing countries choose to investigate
allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in collaboration with the
UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).123 Irrespective of a
troop-contributing country’s failure to investigate allegations of
misconduct involving its personnel, the United Nations’ conducts its
own investigation on the matter.124 If the possible misconduct is
serious and involves one or more members of a military contingent,
the UN usually refers the matter to the Permanent Mission of the
country in question and requests that the government appoint a
national investigation officer to look into the allegations.125
Countries must report back to the UN on the result of the
investigation and on any actions taken.126 Because the troopcontributing countries retain jurisdiction over their troops,
disciplinary sanctions and any other judicial actions, including
criminal or civil accountability, are similarly the responsibility of the
national jurisdiction of the individual involved.127 The United
Nations can, however, repatriate the individuals concerned on
disciplinary grounds and ban them from future participation in
peacekeeping operations.128 However, the United Nations itself
cannot hold the individuals criminally liable.129
Some tribunals have attempted to specifically address the issue of
misconduct by peacekeepers, but the narrow scope of each tribunal
significantly limits who can be prosecuted under the tribunal
system.130 For example, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. UN Complaints, supra note 119 (“Since July 2016, troop-contributing
countries are required to include national investigation officers within their
contingents to ensure that investigations start in a timely manner.”).
126. Id.
127. United Nations, supra note 8.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS:
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 603 (2006) (explaining
tribunals have been given very limited scope due to the specific jurisdiction of each
tribunal).
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Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) exposed peacekeepers to
individual liability under international criminal law, particularly
liability for war crimes potentially committed by peacekeepers.131
The ICTY prosecutor conducted investigations of war crimes
purportedly committed by Dutch peacekeepers as part of the United
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia, but the
charges were dismissed and no peacekeeper was ever indicted.132
Another tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),
which was established in 2000, went a different direction.133 The
SCSL essentially applies the prosecution system already in place to
this tribunal specifically.134 However, the current UN system was not
actually in place at the time the SCSL was established. In the Statute
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the tribunal specifically gives
the sending State primary jurisdiction over “any transgressions by
peacekeepers and related personnel present in Sierra Leone.”135
The Statute does, however, permit the Court to exercise
jurisdiction over peacekeepers if: (1) the sending State is unwilling
or legitimately unable to investigate or prosecute, and (2) the
Security Council gives authorization.136 This provision in the SCSL
statute challenges the internationalized criminal law system
established in Sierra Leone because it creates no obligation to ensure
domestic prosecution of the international crimes potentially
committed by peacekeepers in Sierra Leone.137
Moreover, it effectively exempts jurisdiction of peacekeepers but
131. See KNOOPS, supra note 73, at 24 (providing examples of the effectiveness
of each tribunal while also exposing the limited jurisdictions).
132. KNOOPS, supra note 73, at 24.
133. Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Sierra LeoneU.N., Apr. 12, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 38342 [hereinafter Special Court for Sierra
Leone Agreement].
134. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, annex, Agreement, Sierra
Leone-U.N., art. 1, ¶ 1, Apr. 12, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 38342 [hereinafter Statute of
the SCSL].
135. Statute of the SCSL, art. 1, ¶ 2.
136. Statute of the SCSL, art. 1, ¶ 3 (creating jurisdiction almost identical to the
jurisdiction of the ICC).
137. KNOOPS, supra note 73, at 4.
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then allows it with approval from the Security Council.138
Nonetheless, the Secretary-General stated that the United Nations
139
would not apply that amnesty to genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law.140 This implies that peacekeepers should be
prosecuted for committing these crimes.141
In addition, rape is relatively established as an international
crime.142 Based on the ad hoc tribunals’ treatment of rape as a crime,
rape can be prosecuted as genocide, a war crime, and a crime against
humanity.143 Rape first received treatment as a violation of
international humanitarian law after World War II, but the most
important development in establishing rape as an international crime
came with the ICTY and ICTR.144 The tribunals were forced to create
their own definitions of rape because there was no international
definition at their inception.145 Consequently, the tribunals’ decisions
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leona, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. s/2000/915
(Oct. 4, 2000).
141. KNOOPS, supra note 73, at 5.
142. See Mark Ellis, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, 38
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 225, 227-31 (2007) (documenting the development of
international law concerning rape as a specific crime).
143. Id. at 229.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see Press Release, Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals,
Historic Judgement Finds Akayesu Guilty of Genocide, U.N. Press Release (Sept.
2,
1998),
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/news/historic-judgement-finds-akayesuguilty-genocide (defining rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive” with broad
allowance for acts that fall under sexual violence and noting that “coercive
circumstance[s] did not need to be evidenced by a show of physical force”); Press
Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Furundzija
Case: The Judgement of the Trial Chamber Anto Furundzija found guilty on both
charges and sentenced to 10 years in prison, U.N. Press Release JL/PIU/372-E
(Dec. 10, 1998), http://www.icty.org/en/press/furundzija-case-judgement-trialchamber-anto-furundzija-found-guilty-both-charges-and (defining rape as “the
sexual penetration . . . either of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the
perpetrator, or any other object used by the perpetrator, or of the mouth of the
victim by the penis of the perpetrator, where such penetration is effected by
coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person”).
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ultimately established the specific elements for the crime of rape in
international law.146

B. TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES USUALLY INVOKE
DOMESTIC MILITARY TRIBUNALS TO PROSECUTE MISCONDUCT BY
THE PEACEKEEPERS THEY CONTRIBUTED
Because of the nature of the current UN system to address
peacekeeper misconduct, troop-contributing countries are responsible
for prosecuting their troops in order to hold them criminally liable
for their illegal acts.147 If the countries do prosecute their
peacekeepers, they generally use military tribunals.148 This section
outlines instances of misconduct by peacekeepers from Canada,
Belgium, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that
were prosecuted or are currently being prosecuted in domestic
military tribunals. This section also addresses how the United States
deals with misconduct within its troops that are assisting with peace
operations.
One particularly famous example of peacekeeper misconduct is
the group of Canadian officers who tortured to death a sixteen-year
old Somali civilian in the early 1990s.149 Another instance from
Somalia are the Belgian peacekeepers that held a Somali boy over a
fire.150 More recently, UN peacekeepers from the DRC are accused
of raping or sexually exploiting at least eight women and girls in the
CAR.151 Moreover, despite accusations of misconduct, U.S. troops
146. Ellis, supra note 142, at 229, 231.
147. United Nations, supra note 8.
148. Marten Zwanenburg, The Statute for an International Criminal Court and
the United States: Peacekeepers Under Fire?, EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 124, 128
(1999), http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/10/1/569.pdf.
149. Kakule Kalwahali, The Crimes Committed by UN Peacekeepers in Africa:
A Reflection of Jurisdictional and Accountability Issues 223-24 (Feb. 2013)
(unpublished L.L.D. thesis, University of South Africa) (on file with author)
(examining the cases against Canadian soldiers involved in the torturing a Somali
teenager to death in 1993 and the subsequent appeals of those cases).
150. Photos Reveal Belgian Paratroopers’ Abuse in Somalia, CNN (Apr. 17,
1997, 4:58 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/17/belgium.somalia/.
151. Dionne Searcey, U.N. Peacekeepers Accused of Rape in Central African
Republic,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Feb.
4,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/world/africa/united-nations-peacekeeperscentral-african-republic.html.
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are rarely, if ever, prosecuted for violating international humanitarian
law.152
1. Canada
Canada has previously investigated and prosecuted its
peacekeepers for misconduct. However, the results do not instill
confidence in the UN’s decision to only allow domestic criminal
prosecution of peacekeepers, particularly with respect to
sentencing.153 The most infamous instance of misconduct by
Canadian peacekeepers is from the United Task Force Somalia
(“UNITAF”) mission in 1993; Canadian soldiers were accused of
torturing to death a sixteen-year-old unarmed Somali civilian named
Shidane Arone.154
A number of Canadian officers were charged in connection with
the torture and murder of Arone.155 Although Master Corporal
Matchee, the main torturer, was charged, he was found unfit to stand
trial.156 Matchee was largely responsible for brutally beating Arone to

152. See Jeffrey F. Addicott & William A. Hudson, Jr., The Twenty-Fifth
Anniversary of My Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons, 139 MIL. L. REV. 153,
154-55 (1993) (asserting that cases, where U.S. troops violate IHL are rare, but not
nonexistent, and when they do occur, these violations “represent[] a horrible scar
on the credibility of the American military, as well as the civilized democracy it
protects”); Mike Corder, Robert Burns & Matthew Lee, ICC prosecutors: U.S.
forces may have committed war crimes, MIL. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2016,
http://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2016/11/16/iccprosecutors-u-s-forces-may-have-committed-war-crimes/ (showing accusations of
war crimes committed by U.S. troops is an ongoing issue, but for the ICC’s
prosecution to move forward domestic investigations need to have been
inadequate).
153. Kalwahali, supra note 149, at 222-46 (criticizing the trials and lack of
sufficiently appropriate punishments for Canadian peacekeepers involved in the
death of Shidane Arone).
154. KNOOPS, supra note 73, at 20-21 (“Italy and Belgium also initiated criminal
inquiries into the conduct of their peacekeeping personnel in Somalia . . . in
Ministère Public et Centre pour L’égalité des Chances et la lutte contre le racisme
v. C. and B.”).
155. Clyde H. Farnsworth, The Killing of a Somali Jars Canada, N.Y. TIMES,
(Feb. 11, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/11/world/the-killing-of-asomali-jars-canada.html.
156. Kalwahali, supra note 149, at 229.
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death,157 though Trooper Brown participated in the torture as well.158
Sergeant Boland was present during some of the abuse and did
nothing to stop it.159 Private Brocklebank knew that Arone was being
tortured and briefly stood outside the bunker while Arone was
tortured inside.160 Major Seward issued an order that infiltrators into
the camp should be captured and abused,161 and Lieutenant Sox
disseminated that information.162
Trooper Kyle Brown was present during a large portion of
Arone’s beating, took photos of Matchee beating Arone, and posed
for a photo with the victim.163 He also admitted to punching Arone
once in the jaw and kicking him twice in the leg.164 Brown was
charged with the torture and murder of Arone.165 He was found guilty
of torture and manslaughter.166 The court’s decision was affirmed on
appeal.167 Brown was convicted in March 1994; his appeal to the
Court Martial Appeal was dismissed in January 1995; his leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied in June 1995; and
yet Brown was eligible for parole as soon as November 1995.168
Sergeant Boland arrived later in the evening to relieve Matchee,
who had already begun torturing Arone.169 At that point, Arone’s
ankles and wrists were bound and he had a baton stuck through his
elbows behind his back.170 Boland watched some of the abuse but did
nothing to stop it.171 Boland was charged with torture and negligently
performing a military duty; he plead guilty to the charge of
negligence and not guilty to torture.172 The torture charge was
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 239.
Kalwahali, supra note 149, at 235.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 230-31.
Kalwahali, supra note 149, at 230-31.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id.
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eventually dropped.173 Boland was originally sentenced to ninety
days of incarceration, but the appellate court held that it was an
inadequate amount of time and increased his sentence to one year.174
Private Brocklebank was arrested for aiding and abetting the
torture of Arone.175 Matchee ordered Private Brocklebank to hand
over his pistol, which Matchee took inside the bunker and held to
Arone’s head while Brown photographed him; Brocklebank did not
resist the order to hand over his pistol or protest the torture.176 The
Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada affirmed the lower court’s
decision to acquit Brocklebank of all charges.177
173. Id.
174. Kalwahali, supra note 149, at 233.
175. Siobhán Wills, The Need for Effective Protection of United Nations
Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel,
10
HUM.
RTS.
BRIEF
26,
29
(2003),
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1407&contex
t=hrbrief.
176. Kalwahali, supra note 149, at 223.
177. Wills, supra note 175, at 29. See RAY MURPHY, UN PEACEKEEPING IN
LEBANON, SOMALIA, AND KOSOVO 273 (2007). The issue in the Brocklebank case
was the applicability of the Canadian Unit Guide to the Geneva Conventions,
which imposes a duty on Canadian forces to protect civilians in the custody of
Canadian forces, regardless of whether the civilians are in that member’s custody.
The court ultimately decided that because there was no declaration of war or armed
conflict in Somalia and because the Canadian forces were partaking in a
peacekeeping mission (as opposed to a peace enforcement mission) as part of
UNITAF, they were not engaged in armed conflict. Id. at 273-74. As a result, the
court determined that Brockelbank had no legal obligation to ensure the safety of
Arone because neither the Geneva Conventions nor Additional Protocol II applied
to Canadian forces in Somalia or to any peacekeeping operation. Id. at 274.
However, this judgment is flawed for a variety of reasons. Id. First, the judgment
refers to UNITAF as a peacekeeping mission when, in fact, UNITAF was created
by the Security Council as a peace enforcement mission to replace UNISOM I. Id.
Further, the Security Council resolution that created UNITAF specifically
condemned all violations of humanitarian law committed in Somalia. Id.
Moreover, the court’s determination that the situation in Somalia was not an armed
conflict was unfounded; the court looked at no evidence of the death toll or
anything else before choosing to declare that the turmoil in Somalia was not an
armed conflict. Id. Additionally, the Canadian government does not have the
authority to make a decision that essentially exempts Canadian forces from the
application of humanitarian law if it applies under international law. Id. Lastly, the
Brocklebank opinion is highly criticized for being based, at least partly, on the
wrong provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocols. Id. at 274-75.
The Brocklebank decision is the most famous of the court opinions resulting from
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Major Anthony Seward issued orders that infiltrators into the
Canadian camp were to be captured and abused.178 He was charged
with having unlawfully caused bodily harm to Arone contrary to
Section 130 of the National Defense Act and Section 269 of the
Criminal Code of Canada.179 He was also charged with having
negligently performed a military duty imposed on him contrary to
Section 124 of the National Defense Act because of his instructions
about abusing prisoners and his failure to exercise proper command
over his subordinates.180 Seward was found guilty for violating the
Criminal Code of Canada, and sentenced to three months’
imprisonment and dismissal from service.181
Lieutenant Sox was tried at a General Court Martial in Canada on
three charges.182 Sox was a commander in Somalia and
communicated the information that any prisoners captured as a result
of a forthcoming patrol could be abused.183 He was found not guilty
of unlawfully causing bodily harm to Arone, but he was found guilty
of failing to exercise proper command over his subordinates.184 The
court granted a stay of proceedings with regards to the third charge
and never lifted it.185 Sox was eventually sentenced to a reduction of
rank and a severe reprimand.186
2. Belgium
In 1993, members of Belgium’s elite paratrooper unit served as
Arone’s torture and murder.
178. Kalwahali, supra note 149, at 239.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 239-40.
182. Id. at 235.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id; see generally GOV’T OF CAN., MILITARY JUSTICE AT THE SUMMARY
TRIAL LEVEL 14-9, ¶ 40 (ver. 2.2, 2011), http://www.forces.gc.ca/
assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/jag/manual-mil-jus-summary-trial-level.pdf
(“The punishment of a severe reprimand . . . [is] intended to stand out as a blemish
on the career record of the offender. . . . A severe reprimand is higher on the scale
of punishments than a reprimand. They are both higher on the scale of
punishments than fines and minor punishments. They are not subject to automatic
removal from the member’s conduct sheet after one year.”).
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peacekeepers in the United Nations’ “Operation Restore Hope”
mission in Somalia.187 Photos came out shortly afterwards showing
two of the Belgian paratroopers holding a Somali boy over an open
fire, allegedly “roasting” him until he was severely burned.188 A
Belgian military tribunal prosecuted those peacekeepers for assault
and battery in the incident, but they were acquitted.189 Moreover,
thirteen additional paratroopers were put on trial for other abuses in
Somalia, including torture, killings, and the mock-execution of
children.190 Most of them were also acquitted.191
3. Democratic Republic of the Congo
According to Human Rights Watch,192 UN peacekeepers from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and stationed in the CAR raped
or sexually exploited at least eight women and girls in the fall of
2016.193 One of the women, a fourteen-year-old girl, said she was
only released because she managed to scream while two soldiers held
her down.194
The contingent of peacekeepers from the DRC accused of sexual
violence in the CAR was repatriated at the end of February 2016 for

187. Photos Reveal Belgian Paratroopers’ Abuse in Somalia, supra note 150.
188. Id.
189. KNOOPS, supra note 73, at 23. See also Rosa Freedman, Why do
peacekeepers have immunity in sex abuse cases?, CNN (May 25, 2015, 8:51 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/22/opinions/freedman-un-peacekeepers-immunity/
(revealing French troops have also been implicated in sex abuse claims from the
CAR, but they were not peacekeeping troops and no French soldiers have been
charged with anything as a result of those claims).
190. Photos Reveal Belgian Paratroopers’ Abuse in Somalia, supra note 150.
191. Id.; see also Wills, supra note 175, at 30 (indicating the Belgian military
court came to a similar conclusion as the Canadian military court with regards to
the inapplicability of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II to
peacekeeping operations).
192. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/about (last visited July 6,
2017). Human Rights Watch is a well-respected non-profit, non-governmental
human rights organization. Id.
193. Searcey, supra note 151 (noting there was some initial confusion over
whether the soldiers were from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the
Republic of Congo because each victim said she believed the suspects were from
either the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the Republic of Congo).
194. Id.
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failing to meet UN standards for equipment and preparedness.195 As
for criminal liability, so far, a tribunal in the DRC began trying three
Congolese peacekeepers for sex abuse crimes, and there will likely
be more to follow.196 Unfortunately, these proceedings were
adjourned in June 2016 to explore ways of interviewing the
victims.197
The three Congolese peacekeepers are the first to be prosecuted
due to peacekeeping misconduct from this mission.198 They appeared
before a military tribunal in Ndolo, a prison north of the capital of
Kinshasa.199 Two of the soldiers were accused of raping minors,
while the third was charged with attempted rape.200 All three pleaded
not guilty.201 The Congolese peacekeepers are being tried in groups
of three.202
The trial for these Congolese peacekeepers in the DRC is good
progress towards holding peacekeepers accountable for their
inappropriate actions in the CAR.203 But this is merely one piece of a
much larger problem. A total of twenty-one Congolese peacekeepers
are accused of sexual abuse in CAR, 204 and the three who began trial
195. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC COUNTRY
SUMMARY
4
(2017)
[hereinafter
CAR
COUNTRY
SUMMARY],
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/central-african-republic
(facing the repatriated DRC troops were numerous other allegations, including
sexual exploitation and abuse).
196. UN peacekeepers go on trial for CAR sex abuse, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 05,
2016, 12:03 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/peacekeepers-trial-sexabuse-car-160405040318812.html.
197. CAR COUNTRY SUMMARY, supra note 195, at 4.
198. UN peacekeepers go on trial for CAR sex abuse, supra note 196.
199. Central African Republic abuse: UN troops tried in DR Congo, BBC (Apr.
5, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35968296.
200. Id.
201. UN peacekeepers go on trial for CAR sex abuse, supra note 196.
202. Central African Republic abuse: UN troops tried in DR Congo, supra note
199.
203. Id.; cf. Aaron Ross, South African court to try misconduct against
peacekeepers in Congo, REUTERS, (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-congodemocratic-safrica-peacekeeping-idUSKCN0WD1SV
(highlighting a South African military court in the DRC that is currently
prosecuting thirty-two South African peacekeepers accused of misconduct).
204. Central African Republic abuse: UN troops tried in DR Congo, supra note
199.
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in the spring of 2016 are the only Congolese peacekeepers that have
been put on trial for their actions thus far.205
4. United States
The United States has enacted the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), which is essentially a disciplinary system for the
armed services.206 The UCMJ “ensures that the rights of a defendant
are strenuously checked by various levels of command throughout
the prosecution of the crime.”207 But the United States is criticized
for not applying the UCMJ when its troops are accused of violating
international humanitarian law.208
The United States is different than most countries in that it does
not give troops to the United Nations for peacekeeping; it primarily
provides funding to the United Nations for peacekeeping
operations.209 However, the United States does send troops to help
205. Id.; see also Central African Republic: Murder by Peacekeepers, HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(June
7,
2016,
12:00
AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/07/central-african-republic-murderpeacekeepers (announcing shortly after these trials the results of an investigation
indicating that soldiers from the Republic of Congo killed at least eighteen people,
including women and children, between December 2013 and June 2015 while they
were serving as peacekeepers in the CAR; noting that no peacekeepers from the
Republic of Congo have been tried for crimes related to the rapes also associated
with DRC peacekeepers or for these murders).
206. Uniform Code of Military Justice § 2, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2012).
207. Trevor J. Orsinger, A Military Law Primer: How the Uniform Code of
Military Justice is a Model for the Treatment of Defendants in Criminal Cases, 19
J. DUPAGE COUNTY B. ASS’N, Apr. 2007, http://www.dcba.org/mpage/
vol190407art3.
208. See, e.g., Comm. Against Torture, Concluding observations on the third to
fifth periodic reports of United States of America, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 (2014) (stating concerns about the sexual violence and rape
in the U.S. military and instructing the U.S. to protect complainants and witnesses
from acts of retaliation); Embattled: Retaliation against Sexual Assault Survivors
in the U.S. Military, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 28, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2015/05/18/embattled/retaliation-against-sexual-assault-survivors-usmilitary (reporting that the military’s criminal code, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, prohibits retaliation against victims of sexual assault while incidents of
retaliation remain high).
209. Brett D. Schaefer, United Nations Peacekeeping Flaws and Abuses: The
U.S. Must Demand Reform, BACKGROUNDER, no. 3131, Aug. 2, 2016, at 1,
https://report.heritage.org/bg3131.
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with peacekeeping efforts. Those troops, sometimes called U.S.
peacekeepers, were initially given immunity from the jurisdiction of
the ICC.210
Moreover, even when U.S. troops do not have immunity, they are
generally not prosecuted domestically or internationally for
violations of the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian
law.211 For example, allegations have surfaced that U.S. soldiers
committed war crimes in Afghanistan, and although the ICC
prosecutor signaled that a full investigation is likely, currently no
such investigation has occurred.212

C. NATO HAS NOT YET ENCOUNTERED PEACEKEEPER
MISCONDUCT WITHIN ITS RANKS
NATO’s peacekeeping efforts are more recent than the United
Nations. NATO’s first peacekeeping operation began in 1995, and it
has continued participating in peacekeeping operations ever since.213
NATO peacekeepers were informally accused of misconduct in
Yugoslavia.214 However, the ICTY prosecutor chose not to
investigate NATO for the alleged war crimes as a result of NATO’s
intervention in Yugoslavia, even though the ICTY likely had proper
jurisdiction to do so.215
NATO attempts to deal with troop problems prospectively and

210. Felicity Barringer, U.N. Renews U.S. Peacekeepers’ Exemption From
Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES, (June 13, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/06/13/world/un-renews-us-peacekeepers-exemption-from-prosecution.html.
211. Somini Sengupta & Marlise Simons, U.S. Forces May Have Committed
War Crimes in Afghanistan, Prosecutor Says, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/world/asia/united-states-torture-afghanistaninternational-criminal-court.html?_r=0.
212. Id.
213. 20 years since NATO’s first major peacekeeping operation, NATO (Dec.
20, 2015), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_126141.htm.
214. Anne-Sophie Massa, NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo and the Decision of
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Not to Investigate: An Abusive Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion?, 24
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 610, 611-12 (2006).
215. Id. at 611 (considering an assessment of the NATO military campaign, the
Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, conceded NATO made mistakes but did not
deliberately target civilians or unlawful military targets).
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administratively.216 NATO would likely mirror the UN system and
rely on domestic courts of troop-contributing countries to investigate
and, if necessary, to prosecute misconduct by its peacekeepers. Other
than the unsubstantiated allegations from the conflict in Yugoslavia,
NATO has mostly stayed out of the controversy surrounding
peacekeeper misconduct.217 Nonetheless, NATO has implemented
policies to try to prevent sexual misconduct by its peacekeepers.218
As of 2015, there were no known allegations of sexual misconduct
against NATO peacekeepers.219

IV. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD
INTEGRATE UN PEACEKEEPERS INTO THE
JURISDICTION OF THE ICC TO ADDRESS THE
OVERWHELMING FAILURE TO IMPOSE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR UN PEACEKEEPER
MISCONDUCT
Of the potential solutions to increase prosecution of UN
peacekeepers for their misconduct, the best solution is to incorporate
UN peacekeepers into the jurisdiction of the ICC. The crimes
216. Warsaw Summit Communiqué, NATO (July 9, 2016), http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en (announcing a more
“robust” policy and enhanced preventative training to prevent grave violations
against children, including sexual violence, in armed conflict situations where
there are NATO-led operations and missions).
217. See Michael Fleshman, Tough UN line on peacekeeper abuses,
AFRICARENEWAL (April 2005), http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april2005/tough-un-line-peacekeeper-abuses (discussing how a formal investigation
revealed insufficient evidence to substantiate allegations of misconduct by UN and
NATO peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia).
218. Keith J. Allred, Peacekeepers and Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel
the Demand for Trafficked Woman and New Hope for Stopping It, 33 ARMED
FORCES & SOC’Y 5, 5 (Oct. 2006), http://www.operationspaix.net/
DATA/DOCUMENT/5507~v~Peacekeepers_and_Prostitutes__How_Deployed_F
orces_Fuel_the_Demand_for_Trafficked_Women_and_New_Hope_for_Stopping_
It.pdf. See generally Women, Peace and Security: NATO, UNSCR 1325 and
related
Resolutions,
NATO
(Dec.
6,
2016,
3:38
PM),
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en.
219. Off. to Monitor & Combat Trafficking in Persons, Stopping Human
Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation, and Abuse by International Peacekeepers, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, (June 12, 2007), https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/tip/rls/
tiprpt/2007/86207.htm.
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committed by UN peacekeepers already fall under the jurisdiction of
the ICC. Additionally, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC
would preserve initial national jurisdiction over peacekeeper
misconduct, while also establishing a secondary body with
jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes in the event that the applicable
national government does not.
Thus, the ICC is the most logical mechanism to ensure prosecution
of UN peacekeepers. Integrating peacekeepers within the jurisdiction
of ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, though efficient in theory, would not
account for all the peacekeeper misconduct that occurs in conflict
situations where a tribunal is not created. Ideally, the international
community would establish a new court system solely to prosecute
UN peacekeeper misconduct, but the political and logistical
components make this solution nearly impossible to execute in the
foreseeable future.

A. INCORPORATING UN PEACEKEEPERS INTO THE JURISDICTION OF
THE ICC IS THE MOST APPROPRIATE SOLUTION TO IMMEDIATELY
ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR
PEACEKEEPER MISCONDUCT
The most logical and realistic solution to increase criminal
prosecution of peacekeeper misconduct is to incorporate UN
peacekeepers into the jurisdiction of the ICC. Peacekeeper
misconduct already falls within the jurisdiction of the ICC because of
the nature of the crimes involved. Moreover, the ICC’s role as a
court with complementary jurisdiction to national courts means that
giving the ICC jurisdiction over UN peacekeepers would not take
away national jurisdiction but merely supplement national
jurisdiction if countries fail to prosecute peacekeeper misconduct
domestically.
Furthermore, integrating peacekeepers into the ICC jurisdiction
would allow for the prosecution of peacekeepers in a more neutral
setting than domestic courts. It would also explicitly impose
individual criminal liability on UN peacekeepers as the result of
misconduct in the line of duty, something that is currently lacking.
Of course, this solution still has its flaws, but it is likely the best
option at this point in time. Using a system that is already in place,

ss

ridan Pre

The She

180

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:1

even if it is not a perfect system, creates some sense of security that
justice will, in fact, be served.
The drafters of the Rome Statute did not intend to exclude UN
peacekeepers from ICC jurisdiction.220 The original draft of the
Rome Statute, which established the ICC, contained a provision
granting immunity from ICC jurisdiction to peacekeepers, but the
drafters removed it before the final draft of the statute was
proposed.221
The initial proposal made in preparation for the Rome Conference
in 1998, gave immunity to “persons who have carried out acts
ordered by the Security Council or in accordance with a mandate
issued by it.”222 This would most definitely have applied to
peacekeepers. However, because the drafters of the Rome Statute
unequivocally chose to remove that provision, they clearly did not
intend for peacekeepers to be exempt from the jurisdiction of the
ICC.223
1. The Crimes Committed by UN Peacekeepers Already Fall Within
the ICC’s Jurisdiction
The crimes committed by UN peacekeepers already fall within the
jurisdiction of the ICC. The ICC currently prosecutes the following
crimes committed on or after July 1, 2002: genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. 224 The ICC might soon also have discretion
to prosecute crimes of aggression.225 Sexual misconduct, particularly
rape, can be categorized as genocide, a war crime, and a crime
against humanity, depending on the circumstances.226
220. KNOOPS, supra note 73, at 3.
221. Id. (“[T]he absolute exemption of United Nations peacekeepers received
widespread criticism both as to the substance and concept, which resulted in its
deletion.”).
222. Id.
. Id.
223
224. How the Court works, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icccpi.int/about/how-the-court-works/Pages/default.aspx#legalProcess (lasted visited
Aug. 29, 2017).
225. Id. Crimes of aggression are not under ICC jurisdiction yet. Id.
226. Ellis, supra note 143, at 229 (indicating that while the 1949 Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners was the first “modern-day
international instrument to establish protections against rape for women,” it was
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Rape is clearly prohibited by the law of armed conflict.227 After the
mass rapes that occurred in Rwanda and in Bosnia, rape has been
considered a crime that, depending on the situation, can be tried as
genocide.228 Rape can even be an actus reus of genocide because of
its use as a “tool of war.”229 Although rape is not explicitly
enumerated as a grave breach, it has been interpreted as such and
thus qualifies as a war crime.230 Furthermore, rape is not specifically
included as a crime against humanity, but, in the same way that rape
has been interpreted as a type of genocide and war crime, rape has
been recognized as a crime against humanity.231
In the Akayesu judgment, the ICTR categorized rape as a “form of
aggression.”232 This decision might give the ICC capability to try
people for sexual misconduct as a crime of aggression, even though
the ICTR’s definition is in the context of crimes against humanity
specifically.233 Although sexual misconduct by peacekeepers does
not explicitly fall under the ICTR’s definition, depending on the
circumstances of the misconduct, a UN peacekeeper may still be held
criminally liable for sexual misconduct under this particular crime of
aggression definition.
The ICC is intended to exert jurisdiction over only “the most
serious crimes of international concern,” which, according to some

the international crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda that
significantly advanced prosecuting rape as a “genocide, a war crime, and a crime
against humanity”).
227. Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 350, 357 (2003).
228. Id. at 350-52.
229. Id. at 352.
230. Id. at 357-60 (noting the four Geneva Conventions forming the core of
humanitarian law do not enumerate rape as a “grave breach” or war crime and
explaining “grave breaches” and war crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction
where “persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave
breaches of the Conventions shall be subject to penal sanctions”).
231. Id.
232. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 597 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998).
233. Id. (holding that, in order to be a crime of aggression, the sexual act must
be part of a widespread system of attack on a civilian population on catalogued
discriminatory grounds).
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critics, exempts crimes committed by UN peacekeepers.234 However,
actions by UN peacekeepers, such as rape and torture, which take
advantage of civilians, should be and increasingly are a serious
concern for the international community.
Although the circumstances under which UN peacekeeper
misconduct occurs may differ from what is typically within ICC
jurisdiction, the crimes are often quite similar. Thus, even though the
crimes committed by peacekeepers are not necessarily committed on
the same scale as the other criminal acts typically prosecuted by the
ICC, because of the position of authority of peacekeepers and the
vulnerable position of the civilians against which these crimes are
committed, UN peacekeeper misconduct is arguably no less severe
than the other crimes that fall under the ICC’s authority.
2. The ICC’s Complementary Jurisdiction Creates the Best
Compromise to Supplement National Jurisdiction in order to Ensure
Criminal Liability for Peacekeeper Misconduct
The ICC has jurisdiction in a situation where genocide, crimes
against humanity, or war crimes were committed on or after July 1,
2002.235 Additionally, the crimes must be committed by a state party
national, committed in the territory of a state party, or committed in a
state that has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC.236 Alternatively,
the ICC has jurisdiction if the crimes are referred to the ICC
Prosecutor by the Security Council via a resolution under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter.237
The ICC is meant to operate on the principle of complementarity
to national jurisdictions, which means that the ICC is not a
replacement to national jurisdictions.238 Essentially, the ICC serves as
a prosecutorial alternative when countries fail to prosecute their own
criminals. This system would be no different if UN peacekeepers
were integrated into the ICC’s jurisdiction. The ICC would become
234. Michael Gibson, Military Justice in Operational Settings, Peacekeeping
Missions and Situations of Transitional Justice, in MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE
MODERN AGE 381, 393 (Alison Duxbury & Matthew Groves eds., 2016).
235. How the Court works, supra note 224.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Gibson, supra note 234, at 393.
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an alternate justice system for the prosecution of peacekeeper
misconduct when countries fail to prosecute within their domestic
court system.
Giving the ICC authority to prosecute peacekeepers would
preserve the rights of the troop-contributing states.239 At the same
time, it would establish an alternative back-up plan if the troopcontributing states choose not to prosecute their own peacekeepers
for these crimes. This way the ICC would continue to respect
national jurisdiction while also serving as a safety net to ensure that
UN peacekeepers are, in fact, being prosecuted for their wrongful
acts.
Thus, what do we do with peacekeepers from countries that are
members of the United Nations but are not parties to the Rome
Statute? The ICC can assert jurisdiction if the Security Council refers
the applicable crimes to the ICC Prosecutor. Accordingly, whether or
not the peacekeepers who have committed inappropriate acts are
from a country that is party to the Rome Statute is irrelevant as long
as the Security Council recognizes the criminal conduct and makes
this referral.

B. INTEGRATING PEACEKEEPERS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF AD
HOC OR HYBRID TRIBUNALS AS A SOLUTION FOR CRIMINAL
ACCOUNTABILITY WOULD CREATE MORE PROBLEMS THAN
SOLUTIONS
Another logical solution to resolving the lack of criminal
accountability for UN peacekeepers would be to integrate them
within the jurisdiction of ad hoc or hybrid tribunals. This has already
been done for a few tribunals, although no peacekeepers were tried
under this jurisdiction. For example, the ICTY and ICTR exposed
peacekeepers to individual criminal liability under international law,
but neither tribunal indicted any peacekeepers, despite investigations
into peacekeeper misconduct.240
However, this system would be significantly flawed because it
239. Id. (preserving the states’ rights because of the nature of ICC jurisdiction,
in that it allows countries with proper jurisdiction to have primary jurisdiction
before the ICC interferes either due to inability to prosecute or blatant inaction).
240. KNOOPS, supra note 73, at 24.
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would create a lot of jurisdictional problems. These jurisdictional
concerns would be particularly challenging for the hybrid tribunals.
Although hybrid tribunals apply a combination of domestic and
international law, they tend to apply more domestic law, which could
create difficulties for the prosecution of UN peacekeepers. This
application of domestic law prevents consistency in prosecution and
sentencing as evidenced by previous domestic tribunals.
Moreover, what would the international community do for conflict
situations that do not end up with tribunals? Would peacekeepers that
committed crimes in those jurisdictions escape prosecution because
no tribunal was created to prosecute criminals within the conflict
itself? This solution might work to prosecute peacekeeper
misconduct in conflict situations that call for the creation of
tribunals. Yet, it leaves a huge gap for all the conflicts that do not
warrant entire tribunals, but where peacekeepers acted
inappropriately.

C. THE CREATION OF A NEW COURT SYSTEM TO ADDRESS UN
PEACEKEEPER MISCONDUCT SPECIFICALLY WOULD BE
IMPRACTICAL AT THIS TIME
Another possible solution to ensure criminal liability for UN
peacekeepers is to create a new court system with jurisdiction over
peacekeeper misconduct. Realistically, however, this system would
create more questions than answers. Would this be a court within the
United Nations? Would it be a permanent court? If it were not a
permanent court, how would it be decided when the court would
convene? Who would decide when the court would convene? Would
the court be under the control of the Security Council?
This solution is probably too complicated, at least right now, to be
a viable option. Not only are the logistics impossible to determine,
but also the political component alone would likely prevent this type
of court from ever becoming a reality. The United Nations nor its
member states want to get involved in criminal liability for
peacekeepers because some critics argue that peacekeeping extends
the power of the Security Council too much already. Allowing the
United Nations to prosecute peacekeepers would extend that power
even further.
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V. CONCLUSION
The United Nations seeks to maintain international peace and
security, and one of the primary methods that it does this through is
peacekeeping operations. However, the increase in peacekeeper
misconduct, particularly sexual misconduct, during UN missions has
created growing concerns over the effectiveness of peacekeeping
operations.241 Moreover, the failure to prosecute UN peacekeeper
misconduct leaves civilians with little faith in the United Nations’
ability to aptly monitor and solve conflict situations. In order to
assuage these concerns and ensure justice for the victims of
peacekeeper misconduct, the international community should
integrate UN peacekeepers into the jurisdiction of the ICC.

241. Margaret Besheer, Sexual Abuse Allegations Against UN Peacekeepers on
the Rise, VOICE OF AM. NEWS: AFRICA, (July 12, 2017, 3:24 PM),
https://www.voanews.com/a/sexual-abuse-allegations-against-united-nationspeacekeepers-on-rise/3220263.html.
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